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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 10-4173
__________

SHERMAN ABRAMS,
Appellant
v.
PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION, CYNTHIA BACON,
STEVEN ABRAMOPOLOUS, AND ROBERT REICH

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2-07-cv-04975)
District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on July 15, 2011

Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 20, 2011)

OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge:
I. Introduction
Sherman Abrams appeals summary judgment on his racial discrimination and First
Amendment retaliation claims against the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
(PATH) and several of its employees. He contends that the District Court overlooked
evidence that PATH‘s basis for terminating him was pretextual and retaliatory. Because
Abrams did not offer sufficient evidence to present a triable issue of fact on his claims,
we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
II. Background1
PATH is a governmental entity created by an interstate compact between the
States of New York and New Jersey, with the approval of Congress. See 42 Stat. 174
(1921); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-1 et seq.; N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6401 et seq.. PATH
operates a transit rail system connecting New York and New Jersey across the Hudson
River. Abrams, an African American, was employed by PATH for thirteen years—from
February 1992 to August 2005—in a position designated by PATH as ―Trackman I.‖ As
a Trackman I, Abrams worked on PATH‘s railroad tracks, and his tasks included lifting,
moving, and placing railroad spikes, ties, and rails. As a result, PATH required that
1

Because we write only for the parties, we briefly summarize the undisputed facts,
drawing all inferences in favor of Abrams, the non-moving party. See Barefoot Architect,
Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011).
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Abrams be able to walk in track areas, climb wall ladders, stand for long periods of time
(two to three hours), crouch for up to 30 minutes, lift material weighing up to 100
pounds, and handle heavy equipment weighing 45-90 pounds.
Throughout Abrams‘s employment he was obese, and from at least 1998 he also
suffered from chronic cellulitis and phlebitis. Due to these medical conditions, Abrams
was absent from work for protracted periods of time: PATH attendance records indicate
that he was absent on paid leave for 282 weeks, or almost 5½ of the 13 years he worked
at PATH. Over the course of his employment, Abrams also repeatedly complained about
his treatment at PATH, raising union grievances, filing complaints with the EEOC, and
bringing unrelated lawsuits against PATH.
Abrams‘s orthopedist, Dr. Lee, was deposed in one of these lawsuits in January
2005 and testified that Abrams should not be in a job that required a lot of walking and
standing or that required walking on uneven surfaces. After learning of this testimony,
Paul Moreno, a superintendent at PATH, requested an evaluation of whether Abrams was
able to perform the duties of a trackman. Moreno also noted that, since January 1, 2004,
Abrams had been out sick for 140 days, and that Abrams had given notice that he would
continue on sick leave until June 2005.
On March 8, 2005, Dr. Jaffe, an orthopedic surgeon, examined Abrams for PATH.
Dr. Jaffe diagnosed Abrams with a torn meniscus and concluded that he was able to hold
―a very sedentary position,‖ but could not perform tasks such as ―walking, climbing
stairs, and getting up and down from a seated position.‖ Abrams was then evaluated by
PATH‘s Office of Medical Services (OMS) and Dr. Duke, PATH‘s Chief Medical
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Officer, reported that Abrams was ―fit for duty as a Trackman with a permanent
restriction of ‗no lifting over 50 pounds, no squatting, bending or climbing; no prolonged
standing or walking – not utilized.‘‖ In April 2005, Dr. Lee responded to Dr. Jaffe‘s
opinion and agreed with him that Abrams should ―avoid excessive stair climbing,‖ and
―should not walk on uneven surfaces that he does when working as a trackman.‖ But Dr.
Lee also opined that Abrams ―is fit for duty. He may return to duty with the restrictions
of not going back as a trackman. He can work regular duty on floors that have even
surfaces if this is available.‖ A week after Dr. Lee‘s report, Dr. Jaffe reported to Dr.
Duke that he had reviewed the job requirements for a trackman and had concluded ―with
a high degree of medical certainty‖ that Abrams ―will not be able to perform the full
duties of a Trackman I.‖ Abrams was then re-evaluated by OMS and Dr. Duke
concluded that ―he is never fit to perform the duties of Trackman I.‖
In June 2005, at the request of Abrams‘s union, the Transport Workers Union of
America (TWU), PATH convened an Employee Review Committee to meet with Abrams
concerning other job opportunities at PATH. Abrams expressed interest in each of the
six alternative positions identified by the Committee but, based on his medical condition,
Abrams was ―not capable of performing the full duties‖ for any of the positions. TWU
and PATH then agreed to convene a Board of Doctors to determine whether Abrams was
medically disqualified from holding the position of Trackman I. PATH designated Dr.
Duke to represent it on the Board and TWU designated Dr. Lee as its representative. Dr.
Duke and Dr. Lee were then required to agree on a third doctor to serve on the Board, and
after exchanging several names, ultimately agreed on Dr. Schob. Dr. Dukes had
4

proposed Dr. Schob and had certified that he ―is not associated with PATH or me in any
matter.‖ In September 2005, Dr. Schob examined Abrams, consulted his medical
records, and provided a detailed medical report, concluding that Abrams was not
medically fit for the position of Trackman I. The Board concluded by a 2-1 vote that
Abrams was not medically fit for the position of Trackman I.
Two months later, after a number of telephone and in-person contacts from
Abrams, Dr. Schob admitted that, unbeknownst to Dr. Dukes and Dr. Lee, he had
performed permanency evaluations on PATH employees through a company called
Procura. Dr. Schob then wrote a letter to Dr. Duke in which he explained that he felt ―it
was necessary to alter my final conclusions with regards to [Abrams‘s] work status‖ and
that he felt that Abrams ―should be allowed to return to work at his usual and customary
activities as a Trackman 1.‖ On the basis of this letter, TWU requested that Abrams be
reinstated. PATH refused and a Special Board of Adjustment was convened to arbitrate
their dispute. The Adjustment Board considered Dr. Schob‘s original and subsequent
reports and in a thorough, detailed opinion concluded that Abrams‘s claim for
reinstatement based on Dr. Schob‘s revised opinion was ―without merit.‖
Abrams then sued PATH and several of its employees in New Jersey state court,
asserting numerous claims for relief under both federal and New Jersey law. These
included two claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that PATH had
discriminated against Abrams on the basis of his race, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and retaliated against him for exercising his free speech rights, in violation
of the First Amendment. The case was removed to the United States District Court for
5

the District of New Jersey. The District Court dismissed a number of Abrams‘s claims
and the parties proceeded with discovery on the remaining claims.
At the close of discovery, PATH moved for summary judgment, first on Abrams‘s
Fourteenth Amendment claim and then later on his First Amendment claim. In separate
orders, the District Court granted both motions. With respect to the Fourteenth
Amendment claim, the court assumed arguendo that Abrams had established a prima
facie case of discrimination but found that Abrams had not presented sufficient evidence
that PATH‘s stated reason for terminating him was pretextual. With respect to Abrams‘s
First Amendment retaliation claim, the District Court found that Abrams had failed to
present any evidence that his termination was the result of his protected speech. The
court further noted that both of Abrams‘s claims were deficient as to PATH because he
had not presented any evidence of an unconstitutional policy or custom that would
support a finding of liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978).2
III. Discussion
We review de novo the District Court‘s grant of summary judgment. Barefoot
Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011). ―While ‗[t]he evidence of the
non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor‘
in determining whether a genuine factual question exists, summary judgment should not

2

The District Court also granted summary judgment on Abrams‘s Equal
Protection claim based on disability discrimination. Abrams does not appeal this ruling.
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be denied unless there is sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find for the
nonmovant.‖ Id. (citations omitted).
The District Court properly granted summary judgment on Abrams‘s First
Amendment retaliation claim against the remaining individual defendants.3 Like the
District Court, we assume arguendo that Abrams‘s complaints about discriminatory
practices at PATH were protected speech under the First Amendment and consider
whether he presented evidence that his speech was a ―substantial factor‖ in his
termination. See Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2009). Abrams argues
that the District Court overlooked evidence of temporal proximity and a ―pattern of
antagonism‖ that supported such an inference. But he has not provided—either before
the District Court or this Court—any indication of the timing of his protected speech or
how this speech related to retaliatory action against him, both of which are essential to a
showing of temporal proximity or pattern of antagonism. See Abramson v. William
Paterson College of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 288 (3d Cir. 2001); Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers
Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000).
Summary judgment was also proper on Abrams‘s Equal Protection claim based on
alleged racial discrimination. Abrams first contends that the District Court erred in
3

Summary judgment was also proper on Abrams‘s Monell claims against PATH.
As a state agency, PATH can only be held liable under § 1983 for Abrams‘s termination
if the termination arose from an unconstitutional policy or custom of PATH. Brown v.
City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 292 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
Abrams contends that Dr. Duke‘s improper selection of Dr. Schob as a ―neutral‖ doctor
despite Dr. Shob‘s connection to PATH supports an inference that PATH had a policy of
deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. This inference is dubious at best, and falls
well short of the exacting standard applied to a Monell claim based on a single incident.
See Brown, 386 F.3d at 292-93.
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finding insufficient evidence of pretext and points to countervailing medical evidence and
a number of procedural irregularities that in his view show that the PATH employees‘
stated basis for terminating him was pretextual. This evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to Abrams, shows at most that the Board of Doctors and the Special Board of
Adjustment mistakenly determined that he was medically unfit for the position of
Trackman I. The evidence does not show that PATH‘s reliance on their determinations
was so implausible as to be a pretext for racial discrimination.4 See Kautz v. Met-Pro
Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 467 (3d Cir. 2005); Abramson v. William Paterson College of N.J.,
260 F.3d 265, 283 (3d Cir. 2001).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment.
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In addition to this evidence, Abrams also points to the letter he wrote to the
EEOC and testimony from his deposition, both of which identify several white trackmen
who were not terminated despite medical conditions that he claims are comparable to his.
However, Abrams acknowledged that he had not seen these employees‘ medical records
and presented no evidence that these employees‘ had been diagnosed with such
conditions or that their doctors had stated in written reports and under oath—as his doctor
had done—that they could not meet certain requirements of the Trackman I position.
Although ―comparative evidence is often highly probative of discrimination,‖ Anderson
v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2010), this evidence is
insufficient because it does not show that the white employees are similarly situated to
him, i.e., ―alike in all relevant aspects,‖ Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183,
203 (3d Cir. 2008).
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